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Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels
and the Webcasting Controversy: The
Antithesis of Good Alternative Dispute
Resolution
Jeremy Delibero'
I. INTRODUCTION
Popular music, especially rock and roll, is traditionally a sign of rebellion,
youth, and creative expression. Recently, however, music is becoming increas-
ingly synonymous with big business and corporate influence. The advent of
Internet radio and streaming webcasts are simply one example of this shift.
Organizations such as the Radio Industry Association of America ("RIAA")
have discovered a new way to receive royalties from the performance of musical
works, and have fought vigorously to obtain favorable rates to achieve the maxi-
mum profit.2 On the other hand, small webcasters have fought equally hard to
avoid these large rates. Although arguments for each side are equally persua-
sive, neither is persuasive enough to force a compromise.
In attempting to solve these disputes, all involved parties utilized nearly
every existing form of dispute resolution. Negotiation, arbitration, litigation,
and even legislation have all been attempted to solve the problem, yet none has
offered more than a temporary solution.3 This article will analyze the back-
I. Jeremy A. DeLibero is a Juris Doctor candidate at the Pepperdine University School of
Law, expecting to graduate in 2005. Mr. DeLibero is currently also pursuing certificates for both the
Center for Entrepreneurship and Technology Law with a focus in entertainment law, and the Straus
Institute for Alternative Dispute Resolution.
2. See RECORDING INDUS. Ass'N OF AM., About Us, RJAA Homepage, available at
http://www.riaa.com/about/default.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is the trade group that represents
the U.S. recording industry. Its mission is to foster a business and legal climate that sup-
ports and promotes our members' creative and financial vitality. Its members are the re-
cord companies that comprise the most vibrant national music industry in the world.
RIAA members create, manufacture and/or distribute approximately 90% of all legiti-
mate sound recordings produced and sold in the United States."
Id.
3. See generally, Allison Kidd, Mending the Tear in the Internet Radio Community: A Call
for a Legislative Band-Aid, 4 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 339, 339-42 (2003).
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ground concerning two issues: (1) the correct amount for webcasting royalties, 4
and; (2) the shortcomings of each proposed solution.5
II. THE PROBLEM
A. Copyright Act
6
Whenever a song is assembled, two distinct types of works are created un-
der the Copyright Act.7  The first is called the "musical work."8  While the
Copyright Act does not specifically define the term "musical work," it is gener-
ally understood to include the "actual musical composition, consisting of the
written notes and lyrics."9 The "sound recording" is the second work created.' 0
The "sound recording" can be viewed as a derivative work as it is the actual
audio interpretation of the "musical work."" The sound recording often in-
cludes "creative efforts and interpretations of the producer, engineer, back-
ground musicians, and, of course, the performer."' 2  To make matters more
complex, separate rules regarding performance royalties govern each type of
work.
4. See infra notes 58 to 103 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 136 to 194 and accompanying text.
6. Copyright Act of 1976. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1329. (2000).
7. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(2), (7) (2000). Often times, different people might own the
copyright to the musical work and the copyright to the sound recordings. The recording company
usually owns the sound recordings as works for hire under their sound recording agreement, while
the author of the musical work may be the artist himself, or a third party. MARK HALLORAN, THE
MUSICIAN'S BUSINESS & LEGAL GUIDE 339-40 (3rd ed. 2001). While the royalty in the musical
work from online performances has been a debated issue, this article shall be limited to the public
performance royalties in sound recordings only.
8. Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to Begin, as Soon as We
Figure Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 4 (2001).
9. Id. While § 101 does not specifically define a musical work, such work is taken to include
"both the instrumental component of the work and any accompanying words" and is normally "satis-
fied through melody, harmony or rhythm, individually or in combination." CRAIG JOYCE ET AL.,
COPYRIGHT LAW 172 (6th ed. 2003).
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("'Sound recordings' are works that result from the fixation of
a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks,
tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.").
11. Id. "A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004) (emphasis added).
12. Craft, supra note 8, at 5.
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Within the Copyright Act, copyright owners enjoy an exclusive right of
public performance.' 3 The copyright owner may recover royalties anytime a
third party publicly performs the work.'4 A public performance includes both
the musical work and the sound recording.' 5 Royalties in musical works are
fairly simple; payments are always required. 6 Because performances of musi-
cal works are commonplace, composers and publishers allow performing rights
organizations (PROs) to regulate, collect, and distribute the royalties due.' 7
The rules regarding performance royalties for sound recordings are signifi-
cantly more convoluted. Unlike musical works, the owner of a sound recording
(usually the record label) is not automatically entitled to performance royalties
under the Copyright Act.'" Traditionally, radio broadcasts are exempt from
paying this additional royalty, while still paying the performance royalty for the
13. The Copyright Act allows for six exclusive rights to copyright:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare deriva-
tive works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including individual im-
ages of a motional picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work
publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work pub-
licly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(6) (2000); see also Craft, supra note 8, at 6.
14. Under certain conditions, a third party who uses a work without the prior permission of
the author, the third party may be granted a compulsory license. The royalty rate for this license,
also called a statutory license, is set either by private negotiations or by a Copyright Arbitration
Royalty Panel. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). Conditions for obtaining this type of license
are hotly debated in the webcasting community. However, that is not the concern of this paper,
which assumes that a compulsory license has been granted and a CARP has been convened.
15. Craft, supra note 8, at 4-5; "[W]hen a radio station plays a popular song, only the copy-
right owner of the musical work may claim royalties for the performance of the musical composi-
tion." Joyce, supra note 9, at 563.
16. Id. at 4 ("If a performance of the musical work happens to be broadcast over the airwaves
such as by a radio station, each play is also worth money, in the form of royalties, to the songwriter
and publisher."); see also, Richard D. Rose, Connecting the Dots: Navigating the Laws and Licens-
ing Requirements of the Internet Music Revolution, 42 IDEA 313, 354-56 (2002).
17. Id. at 4-5. PRO's include entities such as Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), Society of Euro-
pean Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC), American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers (ASCAP). See generally, BROAD. MUSIC, INC., About BM1, BMI Homepage, at
http://www.bmi.com/about/; see generally, SESAC, About SESAC, SESAC Homepage, at
www.sesac.com/aboutsesac/aboutmain.asp; Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
About ASCAP, ASCAP Homepage, available at www.ascap.com/about/.
18. Id. at 5; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2000).
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musical work. 9 One theory for this disparity is that the broadcasting lobbyists
yielded great strength on Capitol Hill when the 1976 Act passed.2" Another
theory is the RIAA conceded this royalty because radio was the best advertising
medium for their product.2' However, with the advent of new technology in the
mid-1990s, the changes that evolved would make this dichotomy seem simplis-
tic.
B. Digital Acts of 1995 and 1998
As the popularity of the Internet grew during the 1990s, broadcasters saw
great potential in transmitting their programs over the Internet.22 They could
provide clearer, higher quality performances, increase their transmission range,
and also make advertising on their station more profitable.23 However, this new
transmission medium posed problems under the current copyright law. Past
laws only addressed terrestrial radio transmissions regarding royalties, because
none could foresee this leap in technology.24
19. Id. at 6; see also Joseph E. Magri, New Media - New Rules: The Digital Performance
Right and Streaming Music Over the Internet, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 55,65 (2003).
Over the years, conventional radio broadcasters have built a $19 billion a year industry
based on the creative works of artists and record companies without having to obtain a
Sound Recording performance license, pay Sound Recording performance royalty fees or
meet any Sound Recording recordkeeping requirements.
Id.
20. "Radio broadcasters were able to exclude payments for sound recordings from the Copy-
right Act because the broadcasting industry has a powerful lobby on Capitol Hill through the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters." Karen Fessler, Webcasting Royalty Rates, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 399, 402 n.15 (2003) (citing MERGES ET. AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY tN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, 480 (2d ed. 2000)).
21. Craft, supra note 8, at 6. Record labels have long understood the great promotional value
of radio. Radio allowed the record companies to reach their target audiences with samples of their
product, and the audience in turn purchased much of what they heard on the radio. Douglas Abell,
Music Pay-for-Play; An Old Tactic in a New Environment, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 52, 53
(2000).
22. Id. at 7. At the time, the Internet was completely unregulated, as opposed to terrestrial
radio which was heavily regulated by the FCC. The cost to set up and maintain an Internet radio
station was about $10,000, as opposed to terrestrial radio stations, which cost about $250,000. The
marketing appeal of Internet radio revolved around its ability to reach specific niche audiences, at
low costs, and without the traditional barriers of terrestrial radio stations. See COMM 3353: Infor-
mation, Internet, and the World Wide Web: Chapter 3; Internet Radio, available at
http://www.hfac.uh.edu.
23. Matt Jackson, From Broadcast to Webcast: Copyright Law & Streaming Media, 11 TEx.
INTELL. PROP. L. J. 447, 471 (2003); see also Michael Thicke, Media on the Internet, at
www.mala.bc.ca/-SOULES/MEDIA I 12/zine2000/thicke.
24. Craft, supra note 8, at 11-12; see Daniel Osman, Oh What Tangled Web We Stream: A
History and Analysis of Webcasting Royalty Rates, 21 No. 4 INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. 45, 45
(2003).
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Internet radio evolved in two distinct ways.25 First, operators of terrestrial
radio stations wanted to re-broadcast the same program over the Internet. 26 This
form involved no interaction from the listener, who merely tuned in on the Inter-
net the same way he or she would tune the dial in his or her car or home stereo. 7
The listener would pick up the broadcast in mid-program and hear exactly what
he or she would normally hear when they would tune the dial in their car or
home stereo. 28  Second, some broadcasters wished to transmit an Internet-only
program available exclusively through the Internet. 29  This format allowed al-
most anyone to broadcast a program, from big broadcasting corporations, to
small, home-based hobbyists.30 The ease, quality, and danger of devaluation to
copyrighted materials sparked the RIAA to lobby Congress to update the laws
regarding royalties, and Congress responded.3'
In 1995, Congress passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound Re-
cording Act ("DPRSRA or DPRA").32 This act addressed subscription digital
audio transmissions, what we have come to know today as "XM Satellite Radio"
and "Sirius." 3 The DPRA gave sound recordings a limited public performance
25. Jackson, supra note 23, at 450 (referring to the major business models of streaming web-
casts as opposed to downloading, a completely different concept).
26. This form of transmission is also called a radio retransmission. Id. These types of re-
transmissions are exempt from sound recording royalties provided "the radio station's broadcast
transmission is not willfully or repeatedly retransmitted more than a radius of 150 miles from the site
of the radio broadcast transmitter." 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. 2004).
27. Craft, supra note 8, at 15. This type of Internet programming involves an FCC licensed,
terrestrial radio station simulcasting its programming over the air waves as well as the Internet.
Jackson, supra note 23, at 450.
28. Id.; This type of Intemet programming involves an FCC licensed, terrestrial radio station
simulcasting its programming over the air waves as well as the Internet. See Jackson, supra note 23,
at 450.
29. This type of transmission is known as an 10, or Internet-only transmission. Instead of a
terrestrial radio station simulcasting their programming, these Intemet-only transmissions are not
based from an FCC licensed station. Thousands of these "radio stations" exist because of the low
cost to operate. Still, the number of Interet-only broadcasts has dwindled in the midst of the dis-
putes described in this article. Kidd, supra note 3, at 340, n. 11; Jackson, supra note 23, at 450.
30. Kidd, supra note 3, at 343-34 ("[M]ost most Internet radio stations are established and
promoted by "small businesses, community and college broadcasters, and hobbyists.").
31. B.J. Richards, The Times They are A-Changin': A Legal Perspective on How the Internet
is Changing the Way We Buy, Sell, and Steal Music, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 421, 428-30 (2000) (stat-
ing that the expectancy, especially among college students, for music to be free inherently devalues
music).
32. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, available
at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/pl104-39.html (1995) [hereinafter DPRA]; see also, Jack-
son, supra note 23, at 454-55.
33. Jackson, supra note 23, at 455. Broadcasts, such as the two described here, must be
digital and qualify as a transmission. Id. "A 'digital transmission' is a transmission in whole or in
87
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right, requiring broadcasters offering these services to pay the traditional musi-
cal work royalty, as well as the elusive sound recording royalty.34 An important
aspect of the DPRA was that all non-subscription, non-interactive transmissions
(primarily radio retransmissions) were exempt from this performance royalty. a5
part in a digital or other non-analog format... To 'transmit' a performance or display is to commu-
nicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from
which they are sent." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 2004).
34. Prior to the DPRA, sound recordings were not accorded a public performance right. With
the passage of the DPRA, Congress created § 106(6) which allowed for a limited public performance
right in digital audio transmissions. This meant that sound recordings retained a public performance
right, limited to those performances via a DAT. Id. at 455.
35. "(1) Exempt transmissions and retransmissions--The performance of a sound recording
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission, other than as a part of an interactive service, is not
an infringement of section 106(6) if the performance is part of--
(A)(i) a nonsubscription transmission other than a retransmission;
(ii) an initial nonsubscription retransmission made for direct reception by members of the public of a
prior or simultaneous incidental transmission that is not made for direct reception by members of the
public; or
(iii) a nonsubscription broadcast transmission;
(B) a retransmission of a nonsubscription broadcast transmission: Provided, That, in the case of a
retransmission of a radio station's broadcast transmission--
(i) the radio station's broadcast transmission is not willfully or repeatedly retransmitted more than a
radius of 150 miles from the site of the radio broadcast transmitter, however--
(1) the 150 mile limitation under this clause shall not apply when a nonsubscription broadcast trans-
mission by a radio station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission is retransmitted on
a nonsubscription basis by a terrestrial broadcast station, terrestrial translator, or terrestrial repeater
licensed by the Federal Communications Commission; and
(II) in the case of a subscription retransmission of a nonsubscription broadcast retransmission cov-
ered by subclause (I), the 150 mile radius shall be measured from the transmitter site of such broad-
cast retransmitter;
(ii) the retransmission is of radio station broadcast transmissions that are--
(1) obtained by the retransmitter over the air;
(1I) not electronically processed by the retransmitter to deliver separate and discrete signals; and
(III) retransmitted only within the local communities served by the retransmitter;
(iii) the radio station's broadcast transmission was being retransmitted to cable systems (as defined in
section 11 1(f)) by a satellite carrier on January 1, 1995, and that retransmission was being retrans-
mitted by cable systems as a separate and discrete signal, and the satellite carrier obtains the radio
station's broadcast transmission in an analog format: Provided, That the broadcast transmission being
retransmitted may embody the programming of no more than one radio station; or
(iv) the radio station's broadcast transmission is made by a noncommercial educational broadcast
station funded on or after January 1, 1995, under section 396(k) of the Communications Act of 1934
(47 U.S.C. 396(k)), consists solely of noncommercial educational and cultural radio programs, and
the retransmission, whether or not simultaneous, is a nonsubscription terrestrial broadcast retrans-
mission; or
(C) a transmission that comes within any of the following categories--
(i) a prior or simultaneous transmission incidental to an exempt transmission, such as a feed received
by and then retransmitted by an exempt transmitter: Provided, That such incidental transmissions do
not include any subscription transmission directly for reception by members of the public;
(ii) a transmission within a business establishment, confined to its premises or the immediately
surrounding vicinity;
88
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This loophole exists primarily because lawmakers were too shortsighted in
creating the DPRA. At the time Congress drafted the DPRA, "webcasting was a
nascent technology and Internet connection speeds were too slow to fully utilize
the technology."36 Within the coming years, however, technology would ad-
vance so quickly that by 1998, hundreds of radio webcasts and retransmissions
were available to millions of consumers.37 The RIAA, realizing these services
were taking advantage of a highly profitable loophole, petitioned and lobbied
Congress to have it closed.3
8
The 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") added non-
subscription digital audio broadcasters to the DPRA's royalty scheme.3 9 This
required even non-subscription services, such as radio retransmissions, to pay
this dual royalty.40 The DMCA, in clear, simple language, set forth the exact
criteria for services eligible for compulsory licenses and the exact performance
limitations.4 The key area neither Act addressed, which consequently shall
(iii) a retransmission by any retransmitter, including a multichannel video programming distributor
as defined in section 602(12) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 522(12)), of a trans-
mission by a transmitter licensed to publicly perform the sound recording as a part of that transmis-
sion, if the retransmission is simultaneous with the licensed transmission and authorized by the
transmitter; or
(iv) a transmission to a business establishment for use in the ordinary course of its business: Pro-
vided, That the business recipient does not retransmit the transmission outside of its premises or the
immediately surrounding vicinity, and that the transmission does not exceed the sound recording
performance complement. Nothing in this clause shall limit the scope of the exemption in clause
(ii)." DPRA, supra note 32, at § 3.
36. Jackson, supra note 23, at 457.
37. Id.
38. This action by Congress took the form of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998) [hereinafter DMCA].
39. Id. The DMCA inserts additional language into § 114(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act to
include "broadcast transmission[s] of a performance of a sound recording in a digital format on a
nonsubscription basis." Id.
40. Jackson, supra note 23, at 459-60. Whereas under the DPRA a public performance of a
sound recording by a non-subscription service was a non-infringing use of the work, the DMCA now
requires a license. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. While this requirement reflects a
change in the law, the DMCA does allow for certain non-subscription services to obtain a compul-
sory license. An:
'eligible nonsubscription transmission' is a noninteractive nonsubscription digital audio
transmission... made as part of a service that provides audio programming consisting..
. of performances of sound recordings, including retransmissions of broadcast transmis-
sions, if the primary purpose of the service is to provide to the public such audio or other
entertainment programming, and ... not to sell, advertise, or promote particular products
or services other than sound recordings, live concerts, or other music-related events.
17 U.S.C. § 1140)(6) (2004).
41. Id. at 458. The DMCA allows a service to obtain a compulsory/statutory license if:
7
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make up the focus of this note, was to specify a proper rate or fee for these roy-
alties.
The DMCA required the appropriate parties gather to negotiate a royalty
rate.42 In the event a compromise could not be reached, the Registrar of Copy-
rights would convene a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel to determine the
proper rate.43 Debates ensued for approximately two years from the passing of
the DMCA to adopt definitions, qualifications, and other intricacies of the new
law." During these arguments alone, multiple interest groups gathered to en-
sure favorable rates for those they represented.
The RIAA, with their numerous resources and adequate funding, led the
charge for favorable webcasting rates. 5 Representing major recording labels,
their goal is to ensure the highest royalty rates the market will bear. 6 Directly
opposed to the RIAA are the National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") and
the Digital Media Association ("DiMA"), whose presence arose out of neces-
sity.47 Previously, the NAB represented all broadcasters. With the new rules set
(i) the transmission is not part of an interactive service; (ii)... the transmitting entity
does not automatically and intentionally cause any device receiving the transmission to
switch from one program channel to another; and (iii) ... the transmission of the sound
recording is accompanied, if technically feasible, by the information encoded in that
sound recording, if any, by or under the authority of the copyright owner of that sound
recording, that identifies the title of the sound recording ... and related information, in-
cluding information concerning the underlying musical work and its writer.
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). A service is also restricted in that it:
(1) cannot exceed the performance complement unless it is a third-party retransmission of
a broadcast transmission. . . ; (2) cannot announce or publish song titles in advance... ;
(3) cannot repeat programs of less than three hours in length, archive programs less than
five hours in length, or maintain archived programs of more than five hours in length for
more than two weeks; or (4) transmit the same sound recording repeatedly with the same
visual information.
Id.
42. The Copyright Act specifies that any copyright owner in a sound recording or those per-
forming the sound recording retains the authority to negotiate public performance royalties, as well
as accompanying conditions and terms. 17 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1).
43. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2004); see also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
44. While the qualifications for a compulsory license were heated and greatly contested, the
analysis of definitions and qualifications are not the focus of this paper. However, debates over what
royalties are owed could be the topic of several analyses. See generally, Craft, supra note 8.
45. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
46. Although the CARP chose to disregard many of the RIAA's private agreements, those
agreements, taken individually, show that the RIAA hopes to use its great bargaining position in
order to secure high royalty rates. The fact that the CARPs refused to acknowledge these agree-
ments based on this disparity in bargaining position evidences the RIAA's intent. "As a result,
CARP disregarded most of these voluntarily negotiated agreements because 'they establish[ed], at
best, the high end of the rate range that some services (with special circumstances) might pay."'
Fessler, supra note 20, at 420.
47. Digital Media Association:
was founded in June 1998 by seven leading webcentric companies that agreed on a com-
mon principle - that consumers' desire to enjoy digital entertainment should not be ham-
8
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forth by the digital acts of the 1990's, the NAB abandoned digital broadcasters
and sought to represent only the rights and interests of traditional, terrestrial
broadcasters. 8 Hence, the DiMA was formed to represent the digital broadcast-
ers.49 The RIAA, historically a very strong private interest group, remained the
most influential lobbyist during these negotiations. Their strength, though, was
slightly questioned when the individual record labels realized the amazing profit
potential in broadcasting their catalogs online.5 ° It would be almost pure profit,
except for the royalty to the publishers of the musical work.5 The RIAA then
made another formidable opponent in publishing groups such as the National
Music Publishers Association ("NMPA") and the Songwriters Guild of America
("SGA"). 52
pered by outdated laws, regulations and business models.... [Since its founding DiMA
has sought] to ensure that new media companies are not disadvantaged - legally or as a
matter of industry practice - merely because they deliver content digitally rather than via
print, film, terrestrial broadcast or other traditional media.
DiMA - The Digital Media Association, available at http://www.digmedia.org/aboutus/faq.cfm (last
visited Sept. 25, 2004) [herinafter DiMA]. The National Association of Broadcasters, NAB, "is a
full-service trade association which represents the interests of free, over-the-air radio and television
broadcasters." About NAB Home Page, available at http://www.nab.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 25,
2004) [hereinafter NAB].
48. Craft, supra note 8, at 7. "Webcasters were hoping that the NAB would throw their
weight in on the side of DiMA in setting the fee, but NAB has chosen to keep quiet in the current
deliberations." Catherine Bacon, Webcaster and RIAA Battle over Compulsory Fee,
STREAMINGMEDIA.COM NEWSL., Apr. 12, 2001, available at
http://www.streamingmedia.com/newsletter/041701.html.
49. See DiMA, supra note 47.
50. If the individual record companies could find a way to stream/sell their music online, they
would reap all the benefits of national promotion and revenue, without having to pay the royalties
imposed by the compulsory licenses. The record companies would merely have to pay a royalty to
the author of the musical composition. The second the record company attempted to find a way
around paying this royalty, thus paying no royalties and having virtually no costs, they created
formidable negotiation opponents in the National Association of Broadcasters and the Digital Media
Association. See infra note 52.
51. Craft, supra note 8, at 7, 25-26. The RIAA and the record companies it represents at-
tempts to receive the highest possible rate from the webcasters for performing the song, while paying
the lowest possible rate to the publishers. Id. at 26 (quoting Jay Kumar, RIAA Wants Government to
Determine Royalty Rates?, available at www.au.knac.com/servlet/ArticlePage?articlelD=8471).
52. The National Music Publisher's Association, NMPA, exists to protect music publishers in
the copyright registration and licensing process. Since 1917, the NMPA has "worked to interpret
copyright law, educate the public about licensing, and safeguard the interests of its members."
About NMPA, available at http://nmpa.org/nmpa.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2004) [hereinafter
NMPA]. With the RIAA attempting to enter the webcasting game, the NMPA worked to ensure that
the RIAA did not circumvent royalties owed to music publishers. The Songwriters Guild of Amer-
ica, SGA, represents the interests of songwriters nationwide. "Since the enactment of the Copyright
Act, the Guild has continued to take a stand on every issue of importance to songwriters and the
music industry in general, including home taping, source licensing, derivative rights, author's moral
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Stalemates emerged between all groups involved. Each group contested de-
cisions between two groups and no compromise seemed forthcoming. Groups
appealed to the Copyright Office for direction.53 In December of 2000, the
Copyright Office made a series of rulings, the most substantial of which blurred
the lines between NAB and DiMA.54 The ruling stated that terrestrial radio
stations wishing to retransmit their programs over the Intemet would be required
to pay sound recording royalties as required of Internet Only transmissions. 5
Another significant ruling stated that some level of consumer influenced (i.e.,
interactive) transmission would not bar a service from obtaining a statutory li-
cense.56 After these rulings, the Library of Congress finally stepped in and con-
vened a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel ("CARP") to settle these dis-
putes. 
57
rights, the deductibility of business expenses, compulsory license, and copyright registration fees."
The Songwriters Guild of America, Who We Are: A Short History of the Guild, available at
http://www.songwritersguild.com/history.html [hereinafter SGA].
53. The NAB was the first to file an appeal in November of 1998, followed by DiMA in April
of 2000, and finally the RIAA in November of 2000. While each of these appeals included their
own specific grievances, each also included requests to rule on interpretations of definitions and
qualifications regarding compulsory licenses. Craft, supra note 8, at 20-26.
54. Id. at 26. While these rulings focused mainly on the DiMA's petition, the decisions here
also addressed the issues raised by the NAB and RIAA petitions. See Public Performance of Sound
Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 77330 (2000). Originally, the NAB felt it was on
a different plane than DiMA because the NAB felt its broadcasters were immune from the public
performance royalty. The Copyright Office's rulings stated that the NAB, like the DiMA, would be
required to pay a public performance royalty for sound recordings, creating a common plight.
55. Id. at 26-27.
In a ruling issued earlier this month, the copyright office clarified the Digitial Millennium
Copyright Act, which passed Congress in October 1998, and ordered radio stations that
simulcast programming on the Internet to start paying artists and record labels for the
privilege. Web-only broadcasters were already required to pay the royalties under the
legislation.
Steve Carney, Around the Digital Copyright Ruling Alarms Webcasters Decree Requires Radio
Stations to Pay Royalties on Music Simulcasts, Which Could Drive Smaller Outfits off the Net, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2000, at F42.
56. 65 Fed. Reg. 77330, 77332.,
The Copyright Office has considered DiMA's request to initiate a rulemaking to clarify
that a service does not become interactive merely because consumers may have some in-
fluence on the music programming offered by the service and finds that this concept is
not in dispute. RIAA readily acknowledges that consumers may express preferences for
certain music genres, artists, or even sound recordings without the service necessarily be-
coming interactive.
Id. This primarily effects § 114(d)(2)(A)(i) of the DMCA, stating that a transmission which is part
of an interactive service is not eligible for a compulsory license. See supra note 41.
57. Craft, supra note 8, at 27-28. While completely evident from almost two years of contro-
versy, the Copyright Office officially recognized the conflict between the recording industry and the
broadcast industry on July 23, 2001. Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings and Ephem-
eral Recordings, 66 Fed. Reg. 38324-02 (Jul. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2001/66fr38324.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2004). Opening state-
ments were scheduled for July 30, 2001. Id.
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III. COPYRIGHT ARBITRATION ROYALTY PANEL
At the time the CARP convened, three questions became the focus of the
decision.58 First, the NMPA and SGA asked the Panel to determine what royalty
rate and terms should be instituted for payments retroactive to the effective date
of the DMCA.59 Second, a royalty rate for the next two years needed to be de-
termined.6" Third, the Panel needed to decide what to do about ephemeral cop-
ies made in order to assist in Internet webcasting.6" Little did the Panel know
this decision would set in motion a litany of legislation to amend, disband, and
overturn the CARP process.
In that no compromise emerged between any of the parties involved, sec-
tions 112 and 114 of the Copyright Act required the Copyright Office to form a
CARP.62 During this process, section 801(b)(1) sets forth goals the CARP deci-
sion should strive to complete.63 These goals include:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public;
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work and the copyright user a
fair income under existing economic conditions;
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the
product made available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution,
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of
new markets for creative expression and media for their communication;
58. See Craft, supra note 8, at 28.
59. Id. In essence, a single rate would apply all royalties compounded from Oct. 28, 1998, the
effective date of the DMCA, until the 2 0th day of the month following the CARP decision's enact-
ment, and would be due in a lump sum payment. Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for
the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45239,
45240-41, 45271 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 26.)
60. Id. at 27-28; see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
61. Id. at 28. During the course of webcasting/streaming, the webcaster must make a tempo-
rary copy of the song on the user's computer. These temporary copies are called ephemeral copies.
Steven J. Pena, Licensing Music for Use on the Internet, 662 PLI/Pat 525, 529 (2001). Copyright
law has traditionally allowed for these copies to be made to facilitate broadcasting, so long as they
follow certain rules and are purely temporary. While this element of the webcasting debates is
significant, this article will focus only on the public performance royalty.
62. Jackson, supra note 23, at 461.
63. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2000) with § 114(f)(2)(B) (2000 & West Supp. 2004) (instruct-
ing the CARP to establish rates that would most accurately reflect what a willing buyer and willing
seller would negotiate in a free market).
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(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on gen-
erally prevailing industry practices.64
In addition to these goals, section 114 permits the CARPs to "consider the
rates and terms for comparable types of subscription digital audio transmission
services and comparable circumstances under voluntary license agreements ...
,65 The rates set should "clearly represent the rates and terms that would have
been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing
seller.",
66
With all the background set, the CARP went to work in July, 2001 .67 Each
side, primarily the RIAA and the DiMA, submitted proposed rates and terms for
consideration.6  DiMA's plan included royalties of $0.0015 per listener hour.69
The RIAA proposed its own rate of $0.004 for each song streamed."0 The RIAA
based the rate on 25 separate agreements previously initiated with individual
webcasters. 7" The RLAA's scheme would work out to be approximately 15
percent of a service's gross revenues.72
At first blush, these rates do not seem so different, but when they are actu-
ally calculated out, they show their true differences. To start, imagine one hour
of music, which equates to roughly ten songs.73 Under the DiMA plan, that
amount of air play would cost a webcaster $0.0015 per listener.7" Under the
RIAA's plan, each song would cost $0.004, which would total $0.04 per listener
64. Id. at 801(b)(I)(A)-(D).
65. Id. at 1 14(f)(2)(B); see Jackson, supra note 23, at 462.
66. Jackson, supra note 23, at 462.
67. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
68. DiMA and RIAA submitted proposals for CARP consideration on Apr. 11, 2001. Joanna
Glasner, Webcasters Propose Royalty Plan, WIRED NEWS (Apr. I1, 2001), available at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0, 1 367,42994,00.html.
69. Id. According to economist Adam Jaffe, this plan was comparable to what terrestrial radio
stations paid to ASCAP and other PROs for underlying musical work royalties. The rate for musical
compositions for terrestrial radio is $.0022 per listener hour. Craft, supra note 8, at 32-33.
70. Glasner, supra note 68.
71. Id. These agreements "involve the same buyer, the same seller, the same right, the same
copyrighted works, the same time period and the same medium as those in the marketplace that the
CARP must replicate." Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance
of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,239, 45, 241 (Jul. 8, 2002) (cita-
tions omitted).
72. Id.; see also Craft, supra note 8, at 33.
73. The webcasters, "then raised this amount slightly because webcasters play an average of
fifteen songs per hour compared to an average of eleven songs per hour on the radio." Jackson,
supra note 23, at 463. Using ten songs per hour allows for the reader to see the difference between
the sound recording royalty paid by traditionally terrestrial broadcasters ($0) and the same program
broadcast over the Internet. See infra, notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
74. Craft, supra note 8, at 33. Under the plan proposed by DiMA, the webcasters would have
to pay royalties per listener per hour, no matter how many songs are played within that hour. Id. This
means that after ten songs with one listener, a webcaster would pay a mere 0.0015 cents.
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hour for the same number of songs." To continue this illustration, imagine a
webcast reaches 10,000 listeners per hour.76 Now, the DiMA plan equates to $15
per hour, while the RIAA plan equals $400 per hour.77 In a study conducted of
a successful radio station, research data provided numbers tending to show that
under the DiMA, a station would pay roughly $192,000 per year.78 If the RIAA
plan were to be adopted, however, the same station would have to pay over $5.5
million. 9
Controversy surrounded these proposed rates. In attempting to find a com-
promise, the CARP looked to the individual agreements offered by the RIAA as
examples of "the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the market-
place between a willing buyer and a willing seller.""0 Many of these agreements
were between the RIAA and smaller webcasters, ones without any sort of equal
bargaining power.81 Because of this huge disparity, the Panel discarded all but
75. Id. Under the RIAA-proposed plan, webcasters would have to pay royalties per song per
hour. Therefore, after the same 10 songs are played to one listener, a webcaster would pay four
cents.
76. Surveys show that there were 13,685 radio stations in 2002, with most Americans listen-
ing, on average, twenty hours per week. Arbitron, Radio Today: How America Listens to Radio 3-4,
available at http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/radiotoday03.pdf. In 2003, more than fifty million
Americans received broadcasting content over the Internet. Over 45% of Americans have tried
Internet broadcasting, while the estimated weekly usage is thirty million people, or 13% of all
Americans. Arbitron & Edison Media Research, Internet and Multimedia 11: New Media Enters
the Mainstream 3 (2003), available at http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/InternetMultime-
dia-l 1.pdf.
77. Under the DiMA plan, this figure can be arrived at by the following formula: .0015 (cents
per listener per hour) x 1 (number of hours) x 10,000 (number of listeners) = $15. For the same
hour, the RIAA would calculate the royalties differently: .004 (cents per listener per song) x 10
(number of songs) x 10,000 (number of listeners) = $400. See Determination of Reasonable Rates
and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, See 67 Fed.
Reg. 45239, supra note 71.
78. See Craft, supra note 8, at 33; see also Dave Rahn, Webcasters Royalty Update - Custom
Channels' observations on the recent CARP filings, available at www.customchannels.net-
/subpages/Newsletter/WebcastersRoyaltyUpdate.htm. The purpose of this article is to show that an
established, successful radio station would be nearly driven out of business by the proposed rates. If
the rates can bankrupt an already successful station, how does the CARP expect an upstart webcast
to pay these fees?
79. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 189-194 and accompanying text.
81. Fessler, supra note 20, at 409. "CARP determined that these agreements should be
ignored, in part, because the RIAA was in a superior bargaining position. Also, CARP felt the
RIAA was able to extract super-competitive rates based upon its market power and sophistication in
negotiation and the urgent need of some licensees to enter into agreements." Id. CARP "felt that
the RIAA had manipulated those agreements - and squelched others it could not manipulate-in an
effort to establish an artificially high 'sweet spot' of 0.4 cents per performance that could be trum-
peted as precedent in the CARP proceeding." Copyright Law - Congress Responds to Copyright
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one of these agreements.8 2 The one agreement the Panel thought was represen-
tative of two equal parties was between Yahoo!TM and the RIAA. 3
Even this agreement, though, proved to be tainted by corporate negotia-
tions.84 As shown above, a major difference between the RIAA and DiMA
proposed rates is per-hour versus per-song.85 Obviously, a per-hour fee favors
webcasters, while a per-song fee favors the RIAA.86 After the Panel considered
the Yahoo!TM/RIAA deal, Mark Cuban, former president of Broadcast.com,
87
offered a statement about the agreement:
I, as Broadcast.com, didn't want percent-of-revenue pricing. Why? Be-
cause it meant every "Tom, Dick, and Harry" webcaster could come in and un-
dercut our pricing because we had revenue and they didn't ... As an extension
of that, I also wanted there to be an advantage to aggregators. If there was a
charge per song, it's obvious lots of webcasters couldn't afford to stay in busi-
ness on their own. THEREFORE, they would have to come to Broadcast.com to
use our service.
8
In short, Yahoo!TM and the RIAA negotiated rates such that Yahoo!TM
would pay a high per-song fee for Internet only transmissions, but would pay a
lower rate for radio retransmissions (which made up 90% of its business).8 9
Arbitration Royalty Panel's Webcasting Rates - Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-321, 116 Stat. 2780, 116. HARV. L. REv. 1920, 1923 (2003) [hereinafter Harvard].
82. Id. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
83. Id. "Because Yahoo!TM is a large company with significant resources, the panel felt it
would be on equal footing with the RIAA during negotiations." Jackson, supra note 23, at 464; see
also Harvard, supra note 81, at 1923 (stating that the RJAA-Yahoo!TM agreement was "the only one
to reflect a truly arms-length bargaining process ... between two major players of comparable skill,
size, and economic power"). Yet, even in examining this agreement, the CARP recognized that the
interests of Yahoo!TM was not representatives of all webcasters. Jackson, supra note 23, at 464; see
also infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
84. Jackson, supra note 23, at 471. Yahoo!TM agreed to pay $1.25 million for the first 1.5
billion performances and a negotiated fee per performance after this. For radio retransmissions,
Yahoo! would pay $.005 per performance, while Intemet-only transmissions would be paid at $.02
per performance. See Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of
Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 FED. REG. 45252. (See notes in footnote 75.)
This agreement pleased both parties because Yahoo!TM , when all fees were combined, paid a rea-
sonable rate (as 90% of their broadcasts are radio retransmissions), while the RIAA obtained an
deceptively high Internet-only rate to use as evidence in CARP hearings. Id.
85. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
87. In 1999, Yahoo!TM put up $5.7 billion for a stock buy out Dallas-based Broadcast.com
from its then-owner Mark Cuban, owner of the Dallas Mavericks. The deal added streaming tech-
nology to Yahoo!TM 's Internet broadcasting repertoire. Ashley Dunn & Joseph Menn, Ya-
hoo, Broadcast. com Merging in a $5.7-Billion Stock Deal Internet: Huge Transaction Underscores
Feverish Buying Spree by Web Firms Seeking to Dominate in Cyberspace, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999,
at Cl.
88. Jackson, supra note 23, at 471-72.
89. Harvard, supra note 81, at 1923. Basically, the concept works as follows: Assume Com-
pany X needs to purchase two products, A and B, from Company Y. A reasonable rate for both
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This scheme works out for both companies in that Yahoo!TM ends up paying a
reasonable rate overall, but the RIAA appears to be getting high rates for per-
formance royalties for CARP purposes. 90 "The problem is that the individual
parts of Yahoo!TM are the entire business of other companies."9 How can the
Panel use this agreement as an example of a willing buyer and a willing seller
without taking into account the full effects of the deal? 92
Without any real evidence to go on, the CARP issued its decision in Febru-
ary of 2002. 9' It finally settled on rates of $0.0014 per-song, per-listener for
Internet-only transmissions and $0.0007 per-song, per-listener for radio retrans-
missions. 94 Of course, this sort of mid-point rationale made neither side happy.
The Librarian of Congress ultimately rejected the Internet-only rate, reducing it
to $0.0007 per song, per listener, and equal to that of radio retransmissions. 95
The Librarian realized the Yahoo!TM agreement was riddled with falsities.96
First, the deal did not represent the differences in value between Internet Only
and radio retransmission broadcasts.97 Second, no evidence was presented to
products is $1.50. However, Company Y wants a very high rate for product B because it knows that
this sale will set the industry standard for the price of product B. Company X simply wants a rea-
sonable rate, as it has to buy 9 units of product A and only 1 of product B. The companies come to a
compromise where Company Y will charge $1.00 for product A, and $4.00 for product B. This
allows Company Y to charge a high rate in future deals, while Company Y's average cost per unit is
only $1.30, a reasonable price. This is exactly what the RIAA-Yahoo!T deal did.
90. Id.
91. Osman, supra note 24, at 52.
92. Does a "willing buyer/willing seller" standard actually exist, or is it just a theoretical
model? See infra note 190.
93. The CARP submitted its recommendation to the Librarian of Congress on February 20,
2002. Rates and Terms for Statutory License For Eligible Nonsubscription Services, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, available at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcastingrates.html. The CARP
differentiated between the three major types of webcasts: "(1) simultaneous retransmissions of over-
the-air radio broadcasts; (2) all other Internet transmissions; (3) and transmissions by non-CPB
affiliated noncommercial broadcasters." Jackson, supra note 23, at 462.
94. Kidd, supra note 3, at 352-53. The third category of webcasters, transmissions by non-
CPB noncommercial webcasters, was asked to pay $.0002. These webcasters included college radio
stations. Id.
95. 67 Fed. Reg. 45239, supra note 71, at 45272. The Librarian ultimately concludes that
there is no evidence to support a difference in promotional and/or substantive value between radio
retransmissions and Internet Only webcasts. Id.
96. Id. at 45252.
97. Id. The Librarian stated that reliance on the Yahoo!TM agreement as a starting point was
reasonable, in light of the information given to the CARP. 1d. However, the Panel's flaw came in
finding different rates for radio retransmissions and Internet-only transmissions. Id. "The Panel
reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that nothing in the record indicates that the parties consid-
ered the promotional value of radio retransmissions over the Internet when they negotiated these
rates." Id. "After considering the two studies offered into evidence by the Services, the Panel cate-
gorically stated that it 'could not conclude with any confidence whether any webcasting service
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show that the promotional value of radio retransmissions was higher than Inter-
net Only broadcasts, warranting a lower rate.98 In essence, the Yahoo!TM deal
was "developed to effectuate particular objectives of the parties, distinct and
apart from establishing an actual valuation of the performances."99 Although
this rate seems to be a compromise, no one is happy.'
Each side has attacked both the CARP process and the Librarian of Con-
gress, filed lawsuits, and lobbied for controlling legislation on the issue.' Not
only would the high rates eventually put webcasters out of business, but most
would declare bankruptcy almost immediately because the rates apply retroac-
tively, causing four years of back-royalties to be paid in one lump sum. '02 The
post-CARP decisions appear to keep each side happy, for now.'o3 The question
becomes: why couldn't the CARP, the medium presumed best equipped for
disposing royalty disputes, find a compromise between these organizations?
causes a net substitution or net promotion of the sales of phonorecords, or in any way significantly
affects the copyright owners' revenue streams."' Id. The Panel went so far as to assume that promo-
tional value was a "likely influence" on Yahoo!TM 's RR rate, even though neither Yahoo!TM nor the
RIAA ever argued such. Id.
98. Kenneth Kauftman, Note, Content and Entertainment License Agreements, 736 PLI/Pat
425, 473 (March 10-11, 2003).
One of the most significant errors by the CARP was its conclusion that the parties must
have agreed that radio retransmissions have a tremendous positive promotional impact on
sales of phonorecords - an impact that it did not find Interet-only transmissions have -
and that this promotional impact explained the decision of RIAA and Yahoo!TM to set a
higher rate for Internet-only transmissions. In fact, both the broadcasters (who [benefited]
from the CARP's conclusion regarding promotional value) and RIAA agree that there
was no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that RIAA and Yahoo!TM con-
sidered and made adjustments for promotional value for radio retransmissions. The Li-
brarian agreed with the Register of Copyrights that the CARP's conclusion about promo-
tional value was arbitrary and was not supported by the evidence in the record, which
provided no basis for concluding that radio retransmissions provide a promotional value
that Internet-only transmissions do not provide."
Id.
99. Jackson, supra note 23, at 467 (citing Report of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel,
In re Rate Setting for Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings,
Dkt. No. 2000-9 (Feb. 20, 2002)).
100. See generally 67 Fed. Reg. 45239, supra note 71 at 45241 (as evidenced by the slew of
petitions served upon the Librarian of Congress to alter and reject the recommendations of the
CARP).
101. See generally id.; see also Jackson, supra note 23 at 467.
102. See infra notes 108, 135.
103. See infra note 115. The Small Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002 allowed an extended
period of negotiations between record companies and broadcasters. Id. Pursuant to this Act, the two
sides came to an agreement to supplant the CARP and Librarian of Congress mandates rates. Id.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE FIXES FOR WEBCASTING
A. Internet Radio Fairness Act'0 4
After the Librarian of Congress set the rates, Congress soon realized the dis-
organization in the industry could not go unregulated, and thus endeavored to fix
the condition through legislation. 05 The first measure initiated by Congress was
introduced by Senator Jay Inslee. It attempted to protect smaller webcasters-
those in danger of being completely destroyed by the CARP rates. 10 6 The Inter-
net Radio Freedom Act sought to create a process for music royalties that was
"fair but not free."'
10 7
Co-sponsor, George Nethercutt of Washington, stated that, "no one wins
under the current CARP standard--webcasters will close shop, consumers lose
access to a wide selection of programming, and copyright holders collect noth-
ing." 10t Senator Rick Boucher added that the flawed law in this area "harms not
only the hundreds of webcasters that have already shut down operations, but
also Internet users seeking innovative music programming and artists seeking
alternative avenues through which to promote their music."'"
The IRFA features a break for smaller webcasters, those reporting less than
six million dollars in gross revenue. "' These webcasters would be exempt from
104. Internet Radio Fairness Act, H.R. 5285, 107'h Cong. (2002) ) [hereinafter H.R. 5285],
available at http://www.house.gov/inslee/images/Internetradiotext.PDF.
105. Id. In addition to the IRFA, Congress also entertained many other proposals such as the
Small Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002 and the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Act of 2003.
Id.; see also Internet Radio Fairness Act to Save Small Webcasters?, Afterdawn.com (July 26,
2002), available at http:/ www.afterdawn.com/news/archive/3174.cfm.
106. See generally Inslee Introduces "Internet Radio Fairness Act" Royalties Paid by Web
Radio Stations Should be "Fair But Not Free" (July 26, 2002) [hereinafter Inslee], available at
www.house.gov/inslee/techInternetradio.htm.
107. Id. Neither Inslee nor any of his co-sponsors believe the record companies should not be
compensated for their product, but the rates should not drive out of business those wishing to use the
product. Id.
108. Id. (indicating that the legislation will protect webcasters, ensure access for the public, and
grant a new, continuous revenue stream for record companies). Mark Cuban, the former owner of
broadcast.com, described the best business in the webcasting industry as "[p]repackaged bankrupt-
cies to avoid RIAA fees." Craft, supra note 8, at 24.
109. Inslee, supra note 106. RAIN, a website dedicated to issues relating to radio and the
Internet, keeps a growing list of webcasters who have chosen to stop broadcasting in order to avoid
the royalty fees they regard as unpayable. RAIN: Radio and Internet Newsletter, available at
http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/092702/index.asp (last modified Sept. 27, 2004) (indicat-
ing a list of over 135 and growing).
110. H.R. 5285, supra note 104; see also, Jonathan E. Allen, Of Royalties and Rancor: Recent
Webcasting Developments, 7 No. 6 CYBERSPACE LAW. 15 (Sept. 2002).
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the CARP and Librarian of Congress' decision, and would be represented at the
next CARP session. 1 ' The IRFA required the CARP to abandon the "willing
buyer/willing seller" standard and reinstitute the "traditional" standards and
goals mandated by section 801 of the 1976 Copyright Act." 2 This act also re-
quired future CARP's to eliminate fees for ephemeral recordings that were made
in the process of streaming or broadcasting songs. 3
While the idea expressed in the IRFA constituted a vast improvement on the
current system, the bill was tabled; and the Small Webcasters Amendments Act
supplanted it." 4 This act originally placed a simple six-month moratorium on
the Librarian of Congress' rate decision to give small webcasters time to further
negotiate rates and to give Congress time to come up with ways to protect the
work and the public's access to it." 5 Yet, consistent with everything else in-
volved in the webcasting disputes, the bill could not remain this simple.
B. Small Webcasters Amendments Act & Small Webcasters Settlement Act
A few days after the introduction of the SWAA, James Sensenbrenner, the
bill's sponsor, conducted a meeting in his office with the RIAA and thirteen
webcasters. 6  This meeting eventually produced terms favorable for both par-
11. Inslee, supra note 106; see also Gretchen McCord Hoffmann, Recent Developments in
Copyright Law, 12 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111,214 (Fall 2003) ("The significance of this provision
is evidenced in the next section of the bill, which would have exempted small entities from the
requirement to bear the cost of participating in a CARP.").
112. H.R. 5285 § 3; Inslee, supra note 106.
113. Inslee, supra note 106. "The Registrar of Copyrights has determined that these temporary
recordings have no independent economic value, and should not be subject to a separate royalty
payment. Broadcasters should not be charged for temporary storage files that listeners never hear
and which are not saved." Id.
114. Bill Summary and Status for 107 h Congress: H.R. 5285, available at http://thomas.loc.gov
(last visited September 28, 2004) (showing that the IRFA was left in a House subcommittee). In
September of 2002, despite overwhelming support for IRFA, Representative James Sensenbrenner
proposed the Small Webcaster Amendments Act of 2002. Kidd, supra note 3, at 355. The SWAA
would eventually morph into the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002. Id. at 360; see Small
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 [hereinafter SWSA].
115. Kidd, supra note 3, at 355.
116. Id. On September 30, 2002, a group of 13 people, who attempted to negotiate with the
RIAA to come to an independent agreement, met in Representative Sensenbrenner's office and
emerged with a compromise. Id. at 355-56. These individuals came to be known as the "Sensenbren-
ner 13." Id. at 355; Ann Gabriel, American Injustice Series Part 2: Setting the Stage, Webcaster
Alliance, at http://www.webcasteralliance.com/modules/sections/index.php?op F viewarticle&arti d= 2
(last visited September 25, 2004). Members included Kevin Shively of www.Beethoven.com,
Wanda and Jim Atkinson of www.3wk.com, Mike Hays of www.Twangcast.com, Ron Rubin of
www.BoomerRadio.com, Mary McCann of www.iMNetworks.com, Dave Landis of www.Ultimate-
80s.com, Steve Wolf of www.Wolffm.com, Mike Roe of www.radioio.com, Gary Dobek of
www.Digitallylmported.com, Bill Goldsmith of www.RadioParadise.com, Bob Ottoway of
www.ClassicalMusicDetroit.com, and a representative from www.OnionRiverRadio.com. Kidd,
supra note 4, at 355 n.107; Gabriel, supra.
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ties, causing Sensenbrenner to rewrite the bill to reflect these changes." 7 The
SWAA allowed for percentage of revenue payments, rather than payments based
on the "per song, per listener" scale imposed by the Librarian. "'
Although everyone involved seemed pleased with the act, Senator Jesse
Helms introduced a way to improve, as well as complicate, the bill. 1 9 Helms
reintroduced the idea of private negotiations. 20 His amendment allowed for
SoundExchange, the arm of the RIAA responsible for collecting royalties, the
authority to negotiate royalty rates with small webcasters. 12 1 With this ability to
negotiate, the amendment imposed deadlines for different types of small web-
117. Id. at 355-56. The bill that was once a simple one-paragraph moratorium became thirty
pages of imposed royalty rates. Id. at 356.
118. Id. at 356. The SWSA, in addition to granting a six-month grace period to allow for
negotiations by noncommercial webcasters, also indicated that the new agreements shall include an
option for a percentage of revenue based payment. SWSA §§ 3(a), 4 ("Any such agreement for
small commercial webcasters shall include provisions for payment of royalties on the basis of a
percentage of revenue or expenses, or both, and include a minimum fee.").
119. Id. at 357-60. Senator Helms, reportedly lobbying on behalf of religious broadcasters,
argued that Representative Sensenbrenner's inclusion of the "Sensenbrenner 13" agreement was
insufficient; he hoped that the new amendment would give broadcasters more time to negotiate a fair
agreement that would benefit all webcasters. See id. at 358 n. 118.
120. Id. at 358. This amendment allowed SoundExchange, the royalty collecting arm of the
RIAA, to negotiate private agreements with small or noncommercial webcasters. Id at 358-59. The
senatorial amendment allowed a grace period from royalty payments to negotiate these agreements
and provided that the agreements would be effective as of the date that they were published in the
Federal Register. Congress Approves Legislation Granting Relief to Small Webcasters, 64 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 1598 (2002), available at http://ipcenter.bna.com/pic2/ip.nsf/id/ -
BNAP-5G5QGB.
121. Kidd, supra note 3, at 358. "SoundExchange® is a dynamic nonprofit performance rights
organization embodying hundreds of recording companies and thousands of artists united in receiv-
ing fair compensation for the licensing of their music in the new and ever-expanding digital world."
SoundExchange Background, available at http://www.soundexchange.com/about/about.html (last
visited Sept. 25, 2004). Since the inception of the SWSA, SoundExchange has successfully negoti-
ated royalty terms with the Corporation for Public Broadcasting/National Public Radio, DiMA, small
webcasters, XM and Sirius Satellite Radio, and DMX, Muzak and Music Choice have all settled
their royalty rates through SoundExchange. Id. SoundExchange also:
issues licenses to those users who qualify for the statutory licenses; collects performance
royalties from the statutory licensees; collects and processes all data associated with the
performance of the sound recordings; allocates royalties for the performance of the sound
recording based on all of the data collected and processed; makes distribution of the fea-
tured artist's share directly to the artist; makes distribution of the SRCO's share directly to
the copyright owner; makes distribution of the nonfeatured artist's share to AFTRA and
AFM's Intellectual Property Rights Distribution Fund; and provides detailed reports
summarizing the titles, featured artists and royalty amounts for each of the sound re-
cordings performed by the statutory licensees.
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casters.' 22 Non-commercial webcasters, such as public and college Internet
radio stations, were given until June 20, 2003 to negotiate a rate.123 But small
commercial webcasters and traditional Internet radio stations were only given
until December 15, 2002.124 If parties were unable to reach an agreement, the
webcasters were forced to pay the Librarian's rates.' 25
Congress passed the bill, and President George W. Bush signed it in De-
cember 2002; and negotiations ensued almost immediately.12 6 SoundExchange
and the Voice of Webcasters reached an agreement a little over a week after the
passage of the bill, thereby nearly negating any decision made by the CARP or
the Librarian of Congress.'27 The terms of this most recent agreement allowed
webcasters to pay 8% of gross revenues or 5% of expenses, whichever was
greater, from 1998 to 2002.128 For the years 2003 and 2004, a webcaster must
pay 10% of the first $250,000 in revenue and 12% of gross revenue for any
122. Kidd, supra note 3, at 358-59.
123. SWSA § 3(a)(l).
124. Id. § 3(b)(l).
125. Kidd, supra note 3, at 359-60 ("Should negotiations fail, the Helms Amendment provided
that webcasters would make the royalty payments outlined by the Librarian of Congress in his July
decision."). This fall back serves two functions. First, it allows for a contingency, so that everyone
involved knows exactly what will happen if negotiations fail. Second, it provides an incentive to
come to an agreement. One's incentive to negotiate is only as strong as their best alternative to a
negotiated agreement or BATNA. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 97-106 (2d ed. 1991). By providing a mandatory
BATNA which neither side desires, the SWSA forces negotiators to agree in order to avoid the
negatives of the Librarian set rates.
126. Kidd, supra note 3, at 360. The SWSA passed both houses unanimously on November 15,
2002. In this Issue: News from Sound Recording Department, American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists, available at http://www.rachelrifat.com/Emai/database%20frame.htm (Nov.
2002). President Bush signed the SWSA into law on December 4, 2002. Id.
127. Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 67 Fed.
Reg. 78510, 78510 (Dec. 24, 2002), available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/-
2002/67fr78510.html. SoundExchange and the Voice of Webcasters reached an agreement on
December 13, 2002; the agreement was then published in the Federal Register, pursuant to federal
law. Id. The Voice of Webcasters is a coalition of fifteen of the largest small commercial web-
casters. Eric Olsen, Small Webcasters Threaten RIAA, available at
http://blogcritics.org/archives/2003/07/10/131902.php (July 10, 2003).
128. Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 78511.
[A]n eligible small webcaster that is a natural person shall exclude from expenses those
expenses not incurred in connection with the operation of a service that makes eligible
nonsubscription transmissions, and an eligible small webcaster that is a natural person
shall exclude from gross revenues his or her income during such period, other than in-
come derived from-- (I) A media or entertainment related business that provides audio or
other entertainment programming, or (2) A business that primarily operates an Internet or
wireless service, that is in either case directly or indirectly controlled by such natural per-
son, or of which such natural person beneficially owns 5 percent or more of the out-
standing voting or non-voting stock.
Id.
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amount over that or 7% of expenses. 29 Regardless, all webcasters must pay a
minimum of $500 per year from 1998 to 2002." 0 For 2003 and 2004, web-
casters with gross revenue less than $50,000 must pay at least $2,000 per year,
and those with greater revenue must pay at least $5,000 per year. 3'
Any small webcaster can opt-in to this agreement by filing a form on the
SoundExchange website and those that do are guaranteed these rates until the
expiration of the agreement in December of 2004. Those that do not opt in must
pay the rates set by the Librarian of Congress.'
If the previous analysis does not prove the process needs fixing, the smallest
webcasters are still left without any significant help. Some hobbyists pay just
"$4.95 per month to air their radio shows, which would cost only $282 for seven
years of broadcasting."'133  However, under the current scheme, seven years
would cost the same hobbyist over $14,000 according to the RIAA/VoW agree-
ment.134  The problem is the Voice of Webcasters, for the most part, does not
represent educational webcasters, non-profit webcasters, or hobbyists, therefore
their interests are not sufficiently represented.'35
129. Id
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
133. Kidd, supra note 3, at 362.
While the SoundExchange payments are lower for small webcasters, they are still too
high for the smallest webcaster to afford ... Small webcasters paying the minimum al-
lowable rates under the SoundExchange agreement will owe over $ 10,000 for those same
seven years, with just over $9,000 of that amount due on June 20, 2003.
Id. at 362-63
134. Royalties from 1998 to 2002 were required to be paid on January 15, 2003. 67 Fed. Reg.
78510, supra note 127, at 78511. For the period from October 28, 1998 to December 31, 1998,
webcasters must pay, at minimum, $500.67 Fed. Reg. 78510 supra note 127, at 78512. For the years
1999-2002, webcasters are required to pay a minimum of $2,000 per year. Id. For the years 2003-
2004, two categories were created by the agreement. See id. For those webcasters with revenues of
$50,000 or less for the previous year and anticipated revenues of less than $50,000 for each of the
two years, a minimum fee of $2,000 was required. Id. For those webcasters with more than $50,000
for the previous years and anticipated revenues of more than $50,000 for each of the two years, a
minimum fee of $5,000 was required. Id.
135. Kidd, supra note 3, at 363-64.
One webcaster explains, '[t]he people at the negotiating table did not represent the broad
spectrum of webcasters that are operating today. There were no educational webcasters,
no non-profit webcasters, and no hobbyist webcasters at the negotiating table, nor did
these groups have any significant input into the negotiating agenda ... [S]ome critics
point to the fact that the International Webcasters Association (IWA), to which many of
the commercial webcaster members of the 'Sensenbrenner Thirteen' belong, has not en-
dorsed the SoundExchange agreement.
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V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
Reforming the CARP process is generally hit or miss, and thus far they
have missed. In short, the process typically follows a given pattern. The Librar-
ian of Congress chooses two arbitrators from a list of professional arbitrators,
usually between thirty and seventy five.136 The two arbitrators then choose a
third to act as the chairman of the CARP.' 3 7 Each CARP is governed by the
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel Rules of Procedure.'38 Once a conclusion
is reached, the Panel gives their findings to the Librarian of Congress, who then
may accept or reject the findings based on another series of criteria.139 This
process, though logical in theory, is riddled with holes and problems in applica-
tion.
First, a major appeal of arbitration involves the reduced costs, as opposed to
litigation.'40  This reduced cost usually allows those who could normally not
afford to file a complaint to enforce their rights and interests in a productive
forum. Yet, absent in the webcasting CARP were the smallest of webcasters. 4 '
The costs to participate in this process were estimated at ten million dollars per
interest group.'42 While the RIAA and large webcasters could afford the fees,
Id. at 364. It seems odd that an industry applauds an agreement that is not even recommended by
one of their largest organizations. See IWA-About Us, available at
http://www.webcasters.org/about.htm.
136. Kidd, supra note 3, at 369-70; 17 U.S.C. §§ 802(a)-(b) (2002). A complete list of cur-
rently approved arbitrators can be found on the U.S. Copyright Office Website. Copyright Arbitra-
tion Royalty Panels; List of Arbitrators, 67 Fed. Reg. 5000 (2002), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2002/67fr5000.html. The three arbitrators chosen for this CARP
proceeding were Eric Van Loon (JAMS), Jeffrey Gulin (JAMS), and Curtis von Kann (JAMS). 66
Fed. Reg. 38324, supra note 56, at 38325.
137. Id. at 370; 17 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2002). For this CARP hearing, Gulin and von Kann chose
Van Loon as the chairperson. 66 Fed. Reg. 38324 at 38325.
138. Id. at 370 n.184 (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 251.41-48 (LEXIS through 2003)
(detailing the procedure for formal hearings, suspension or waiver of rules, filing and service of
written cases and pleadings, discovery and preheating motions, etc)).
139. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 802(0 (2002). Following a CARP recommendation, the Librarian of
Congress has sixty days in which to accept or reject the recommendation. "The Librarian shall adopt
the determination of the arbitration panel unless the Librarian finds that the determination is arbitrary
or contrary to the applicable provisions of this title." 17 U.S.C. § 802(0 (2002).
140. "Mediation is an inexpensive way to settle disputes as compared to litigation." Gerald F.
Phillips & Vanessa A. Ignacio, Entertainment Industry Recognizing Benefits of Mediation, 17 ENT.
& SPORTS LAW. 29, 29-30 (2000); Toni L. Wortherly, There's No Business Like Show Business:
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Entertainment Industry, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 162, 170
(2002).
141. Smart M. Maxey, That CARP Is No Keeper: Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels -
Change is Needed, Here is Why, and How, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 385, 396 (2003). "They must
either 'rely upon the records developed by the participating parties [parties to the CARP proceed-
ings] or resort to voluntary negotiations with the copyright owners on terms they may otherwise find
objectionable." Id.
142. Kidd, supra note 3, at 371.
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the smaller webcasters did not have the funds or the rallying force to form and
finance an interest group.' 43  Excluding this large group of interested parties
does not allow for a fair and all-encompassing rate. " Small entities need a way
to voice their opinion on equal footing with larger entities to ensure fair compe-
tition in the marketplace, as well as the disbursement of ideas.' For example,
with employment contracts, arbitration proceedings are primarily funded by the
employer to enable employees to file claims. '46 Any reform of the CARP proc-
ess needs to ameliorate costs and allow participation for all involved. '47
Second, the CARP process lacks complete continuity from one panel to the
next. 48 The CARP process is to be repeated every two years to adjust the rates
from previous years. "' However, there is no guarantee that the same panel will
be employed. In fact, you could almost guarantee that parties will face an en-
tirely new group of arbitrators. 5 0 As a result, a CARP could set favorable rates
for the webcasters one year, while the next panel raises the rates based on their
own evaluation, giving the RIAA the benefit of the doubt.'' Although safe-
143. See generally Maxey, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
144. Kidd, supra note 3, at 371. The IRFA is attempting to alleviate this problem by exempt-
ing the smallest webcasters from bearing the financial burden of the CARP proceedings while still
including them in the arbitration. See Hoffmann, supra note I ll and accompanying text.
145. "The CARP process must include an opportunity for the smallest webcasters, including
hobbyists, to participate in rate setting." Id.
146. See e.g., Melissa G. Lamm, Who Pays Arbitration Fees?: The Unanswered Question in
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 24 CAMPBELL L. REv. 93, 113 (2001).
While some courts contend that the splitting of arbitration fees is lawful, many employees
will be prevented from bringing claims due to prohibitively high forum costs. Conse-
quently, the employment contract should require the employer to pay all fees and costs
associated with arbitration to ensure that no meritorious claim is deterred. The employ-
ment contract is, after all, customarily solely an employer creation, with the employer
precluding employee access to a judicial forum.
Id.
147. See Maxey, supra note 141, at 400-01.
148. Kidd, supra note 3, at 371. "The Copyright Office should establish a permanent, inde-
pendent entity or division of the Copyright Office to make royalty rate decisions, giving arbitrators
the time necessary to gain expertise in the issues they hear." Id. (footnote omitted).
149. "Once a rate is established, the DMCA requires that a CARP meet every two years to re-
evaluate royalty fees for broadcasters." Hoffmann, supra note 11l, at 213.
150. See Kidd, supra note 3, at 371; Maxey, supra note 141, at 397. "However, because CARP
members only serve for two years, and are unlikely to return to serve again, requiring the Copyright
Office to report CARP costs would still have little effect on any given CARP's financial decisions."
Sara J. O'Connell, Counting Down Another Music Marathon: Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels
and the Case ofInternet Radio, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 161, 180-81 (2004).
151. See e.g., Maxey, supra note 141, at 397 ("[R]ates made by these ad hoc panels are often
too narrow to establish precedent. This results from the fact that the decision is often rendered on a
basis that 'focus[es] on reaching a bottom-line result in the given proceeding rather than one expli-
cating a thorough and complete analysis of the relevant standards .... ) (alteration in original).
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guards are in place to prevent a drastic swing, no rate is safe for more than two
years.152 Also, a new panel forces the parties to re-explain the issues of the pre-
vious panel, as well as introduce changes in the market.153 To ensure continuity
between panels, changes in the process should allow for one panel to handle an
issue every time it arises.'54 This ensures a continuity of knowledge and judg-
ment.'55 Alternatively, subsequent panels should be bound by the opinions of
previous panels, meaning that they should weigh equally those facts and figures
the previous CARP felt were important.'56
A third problem with the current CARP structure is the lack of expertise of
the panelists.'57 Each panelist, while an expert in arbitration, is not necessarily a
specialized attorney in the fields of copyright and technology law, or in the mu-
sic industry. 5 Especially with technology increasing at its current rate, it is
essential that those chosen for the panel realize what is at stake, how viable the
arguments are for each side, and the possibilities for profit and promotion.159
For example, the RIAA introduced arguments stating that the streaming media
runs a significant risk of piracy and will replace CD's because of its digital qual-
152. Terms are renegotiated and reconsidered every two years starting in January of 2000. 17
U.S.C. § 112(e)(6). See supra note 148-49 and accompanying text.
153. This is because "[a]ny expertise developed during the process (e.g., in rate-setting or
subject matter) will not likely benefit future proceedings." Maxey, supra note 141, at 397.
154. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
156. It would not be unreasonable to apply the doctrine of stare decisis to CARP decisions. But
see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
157. Wortherly, supra note 140, at 170-71. The main organizations for resolving entertainment
disputes are the American Film Marketing Association (AFMA), American Arbitration Association
(AAA), and Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS). Id. While each of these organiza-
tions hires arbitrators with great experience in alternative dispute resolution and even experience in
entertainment law, there is no guarantee that any arbitrator possesses an expertise in copyright law.
Id.
158. Id. ("Like AFMA, AAA are typically experienced entertainment attorneys. In contrast,
JAMS/Endispute arbitrators are mostly retired judges."). The three arbitrators chosen for the CARP
deciding public performance royalties, Eric E. Van Loon, Jeffrey S. Gulin, and Curtis E. von Kann,
were all members of JAMS. Van Loon is an attorney and has more than 16,000 hours of arbitration
experience, but only partially in the field of copyright. While entertainment/intellectual property is
listed as an expertise, most of his major cases involved major software system arbitrations, numerous
environmental and tort actions, as well as numerous municipality disputes. JAMS - The Resolution
Experts, available at http://www.jamsadr.com/neutrals/bio.asp?.neutralsid=1775. Curtis E. von
Kann is a retired judge and he too, like Van Loon, has a tremendous arbitration background, but his
experience in entertainment/intellectual property seems limited. According to the JAMS website,
the CARP arbitration is his only experience with copyright royalties and/or Internet technology. Id.,
available at http://www.jamsadr.com/neutrals/bio.asp?.neutralsid=1778. Jeffrey S. Gulin is a former
Maryland Administrative Law judge dealing exclusively with administrative law issues. Lawyer
Profile, FINDLAW.COM, available at http://pview.findlaw.com/view/1015084_1.
159. The idea of compulsory licenses for digital transmissions requires full knowledge of how
the technology behind the disputes works, the history of technology and copyright law, and the
alternative business models and profit/promotion potential related to the dispute in question.
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ity. " Realistically, recording directly from streaming media is difficult and
courts have enjoined the creation and distribution of the recording software.16'
Also, due to the restrictions imposed by the DMCA, users are unable to antici-
pate what songs will be played by the service and therefore cannot accurately
find the songs they want to record.' 62 These limits on the frequency and pre-
dictability of songs would discourage users from scrolling through songs and
playing any given song on demand. The point being that most arbitrators in-
volved in the CARP process have little or no experience in copyright law,
though unarguably experts in arbitration. 63 Future reforms to the CARP proc-
ess must include a requirement of expertise or experience in the field of copy-
right, in order to properly weigh critical evidence.
At least one Congressman recognizes this problem and has introduced legis-
lation to eliminate the CARP process and replace the Panel with a Copyright
Royalty Judge (CRJ). " This CRJ would be appointed to a salaried position for
a period of five years.'65 The CRJ standards would require "an attorney with ten
160. "The concern is two-fold: (1) some users possess the technological skill to make copies of
streaming songs, and (2) the webcasts may serve as substitutes for owning copies of particular
songs." Jackson, supra note 23, at 450 (footnote omitted).
161. "[lit is not easy to make retention copies of streamed files." Sara Steetle, UMG Re-
cordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.: Signaling the Need for a Deeper Analysis of Copyright Infringe-
ment of Digital Recordings, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 31, 56 (2000). The U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Washington recently ruled on a similar issue in RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc. 2000 WL 127311 (W.D. Wash. 2000). Streambox offered three products that
allowed the user to download and retain copies of streaming media, which was previously too diffi-
cult and time consuming. Id. The court likened the Streambox VCR to a "black box," unscrambling
RealNetworks signal to allow for downloading a clear copy of the streaming audio. Id. Streambox
Ripper allowed users to transform audio file formats to be compatible with other formats. Stream-
box Ferret allowed the user to search RealNetworks using Streambox's own search engine. Utilizing
these three technologies, a user can search for the songs or genre he or she wishes, download the
streaming audio, and then convert the file to whatever format he or she wishes. The court granted a
preliminary injunction against Streambox's use, manufacture, or distribution of VCR or Ferret, but
denied an injunction on Ripper, presumably because there are significant non-infringing uses
(unlikely to prevail on a suit against Ripper). Id.
162. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
163. See Fessler, supra note 20, n. 108, 109. The lack of expertise of potential arbitrators in
copyright law has lead the Librarian to overturn seven of the last ten CARP reports and has pre-
vented the Librarian and the Copyright Office from finding effective and knowledgeable arbitrators.
CARP hearing report, available at www.house.gov/judiciary/80194.pdf [hereinafter CARP hearing].
164. Maxey, supra note 141, at 404-05. Texas Representative Lamar Smith has introduced a
bill entitled the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2003. Copyright Royalty and
Distribution Reform Act of 2003, available at www.theorator.com/billsl08/hr1417.html [hereinafter
CRDRA]. Under the CRDRA, the proposed § 801 eliminates the CARP process altogether and
grants Congress the authority to appoint an individual to oversee all proceedings previously handled
by the CARP.
165. Id; CRDRA, supra note 164.
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or more years of legal practice with demonstrated experience in administrative
hearings or court trials and demonstrated knowledge of copyright law." 166 In
addition, the CRJ would have a two member support staff with "expertise in
copyright law and in the business and economics of industries affected by the
actions taken by the Copyright Royalty Judge." 167  Not only does this bill ad-
dress the lack of expertise of the current CARP system, it also allows for conti-
nuity between evaluations by having the same person(s) oversee the proceed-
ings.
Another complaint about the CARP process is the ease by which the deci-
sion may be cast aside or overruled.16' The DMCA allows for the Librarian of
Congress to accept or reject the recommendation of the Panel. 69 Under §
802(0, the Librarian of Congress has ninety days to accept or reject the determi-
nation of the CARP, but must accept the findings unless "arbitrary or contrary to
the applicable provisions of this title."' 7 ° The Librarian claimed that significant
portions of the CARP's findings were arbitrary and contrary to law.171 The Li-
brarian, however, seemed to overstep his boundaries in overruling the recom-
mendation based on the law in general, and not as contrary to "this title. '72 The
166. Maxey, supra note 141, at 404-05.; CRDRA, supra note 164.
167. Maxey, supra note 141, at 404-05.; CRDRA, supra note 164.
168. Speed and efficiency is generally an important factor for entertainment companies in
deciding to utilize alternative dispute resolution. Wortherly, supra note 140, at 140. The CARP
proceeding offered neither. The Copyright Office and the CARP, combined, drew out the process
for almost five years. In addition, the decisions made left the parties so dissatisfied that they were
forced to lobby and file petitions for further change. In addition, only a limited number of parties
could partake in the CARP proceedings, and so the solution proposed by the CARP did not reach a
conclusive determination.
169. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
170. Id.
171. See Barry I. Slotnick, Copyright in the Digital Age, 128 PLIfNY 793, 809 (2002). "[W]e
[presumably the federal government] will set aside a royalty award only if we determine that the
evidence before the Librarian compels a substantially different award. We will uphold a royalty
award if the Librarian has offered a facially plausible explanation for it in terms of the record evi-
dence." Marilyn J. Kretsinger, Copyright Office Practice and Procedures, 567 PLI/Pat 151, 185
(1999).
172. According to the Copyright Act, the Librarian is required to uphold the CARP's ruling
unless it is arbitrary or contrary to "this title," referring to itself. Osman, supra note 24, at 52. The
CARP's decision was based off what it considered what a "willing buyer/willing seller" would have
negotiated. The CARP analyzed the content it had in front of it and made a decision. The CARP
rejected 25 of 26 private RIAA agreements, indicating that it felt these agreements did not represent
the "actual market value." The CARP also accepted the RIAA/Yahoo!Tm agreement as a fair evalua-
tion of equal bargaining power and relative value. By doing this, the CARP satisfied the require-
ments demanded of it under § 114 and § 801 of the Copyright Act. Therefore, the Librarian of
Congress, in fact, overruled a decision that was not contrary to "this title," Title 17, but contrary to a
more general law. Id. While no one was happy with the decisions, no one challenged the Librar-
ian's authority. "Why create a Panel at all when its decisions can be ignored so easily?" Id. The
fact that no one has challenged this, and that the Librarian himself believed he had the power to
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CARP followed the standards set up under § 802 in using the "willing
buyer/willing seller" standard, and so their decision was not, in fact, contrary to
the Copyright Act. 173 Therefore, the Librarian of Congress had no place inter-
fering with the decision. It is surprising that neither side, though both thor-
oughly unhappy with the Librarian's decision, challenged it. And, if the Librar-
ian's action is not in violation of his role and the decision could be made without
violation, why does a CARP even exist? 74 Interested parties may appeal the
decision of the Librarian and the CARP to the US Court of Appeals.'75 The
whole purpose of arbitration is to avoid the courtroom and all the negatives that
follow, and yet it seems that the process provides little more than a prerequisite
for filing appeals and lobbying efforts.
Next, as evidenced by the above discussion, future CARP proceedings must
find a way to regulate and incorporate the smallest webcasters in their deci-
sion. 17 While the costs border on unpayable, the miniscule reward for smaller
claims makes pursuing a CARP decision unworthy of the effort. For example,
the inefficiencies of the 1992-1994 Digital Audio Recording Technology pro-
ceedings cost the parties more than $12,000, whereas the award amounted to a
mere $11.03.'7 Furthermore, the decision was then appealed, dramatically in-
overrule the CARP, indicates that the guidance given the process by federal statute is inadequate at
best.
173. "Applying [the aforementioned] principles, the Librarian accepted the CARP's conclusion
that the RIAA/Yahoo!TM agreement represented the best evidence of what rates would have been
negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller for a license to engage in
webcasting of radio retransmissions and Internet-only transmissions." Kenneth M. Kaufman, Con-
tent and Entertainment License Agreements, 736 PLIIPat 425, 473 (2003). By recognizing that the
CARP's conclusion was not arbitrary, the Librarian did not have the authority to overturn the CARP
decision.
174. The Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act would render the Copyright Office to
merely an administrative and advisory capacity only, giving the Librarian of Congress no ability to
overrule the decision offered by the CARP.
175. Kidd, supra note 3, at 370. Any aggrieved party may appeal the determination of the
Librarian of Congress to the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Nat'l Ass'n
of Broadcasters v. Librarian of Congress, 146 F.3d 907, 913 (C.A.D.C. 1998). An appeal must be
brought within 30 days of the Librarian's decision, or else the decision is deemed final. If an appeal
is brought by an appropriate party, "The court shall have jurisdiction to modify or vacate a decision
of the Librarian only if it finds, on the basis of the record before the Librarian, that the Librarian
acted in an arbitrary manner." Id.
176. See supra notes 141-46, 201.
177. Maxey, supra note 141, at 397; CARP hearing, supra note 163, at 12.
Abuses of the process have occurred and the Office has consistently found that it lacks
authority either to prevent these abuses or to expedite decision-making. Arbitrator costs
alone far exceed the amount-in-controversy. For example, the costs of the arbitrators in
the 1992-94 Digital Audio Recording Technology ('DART") distribution proceeding,
which resulted in an award of $11.03 to two individual claimants were more than $12,000
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creasing costs to include all court related expenses. 7 ' Also, because the CARP
did not include the small webcasters, Congress was forced to enact legislation to
fix this oversight.179 However, even the SWSA did not help the smallest web-
casters. 8 ' The CARP decision suggested rates that were impossible to pay,
while the SWSA, representing the opposite extreme, allowed them to pay a per-
centage of the revenue that they did not make, thereby exempting them from any
royalty.'' One suggestion on how to help include small webcasters, while still
creating a fair system, is to create a tiered system. 8 This would create a set
payment that gradually increases with a webcaster's revenue. 83 Alternatively,
(more than one thousand times the amount-in-controversy); the costs of the arbitrators in
the 1995-98 DART distribution proceeding, which resulted in a total award of $6.06 to
the same two individual claimants ($5.04 to one and $1.02 to the second) were in excess
of $21,000 (almost three thousand times the amount-in-controversy); and in the 1991 Ca-
ble Distribution Proceeding (Phase II), the arbitrators awarded $63.74 to an individual
claimant, yet the costs of the arbitrators were more than five hundred times that amount.
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) Structure and Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Reps.,
107' Cong. 31 (2002), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju80194.000/hju80194_0f.htm [hereinafter
CARP Structure].
178. Maxey, supra note 141, at 397; CARP hearing, supra note 163, at 12.
To make it worse from a cost-perspective, all of these matters, after final disposition by
the Librarian of Congress, were appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. The appeal in the second matter was withdrawn; the appeals in the first and
third matters necessitated the preparation of a record on appeal and the submission of
briefs by the U.S. Department of Justice and the parties.
CARP Structure, supra note 177, at 31.
179. Specifically, Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the Small Webcasters Settle-
ment Act of 2002. See supra note 115.
180. Kidd, supra note 3, at 367.
Moreover, webcasters who were not a party in the CARP proceeding were unable to
submit comments to the LOC as part of that body's review of the CARP determination,
on the theory that they did not have standing. This decision makes the CARP procedure
problematic; since CARP proceedings are adversarial in nature, it is essential that all in-
terested parties be represented so the panel would have a complete evidentiary record on
which to base its decision.
Fessler, supra note 24, at 415.
181. Kidd, supra note 3, at 367. Under these contrasting styles, either the small webcaster is
forced out of business and the public is denied a possibly new or alternative music source or, on the
other hand, record companies remain uncompensated for their product. Thus, the result is either
limiting expression and free speech or an inequitable taking.
182. Id. This tiered rate could be tied to listeners, instituting a base rate and then increasing as
a broadcast's listener base increases, or even to revenues.
183. This structure may resemble the federal tax structure, using a progressive percent of
revenue or a progressive flat fee to webcasters in a given revenue bracket. See Federal Tax Rates,
available at http://taxes.yahoo.com/rates.html (charting basic federal income tax brackets).
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the tiered system could include a set payment for those webcasters with no reve-
nue, followed by a tiered percent of revenue system for those with revenues.'84
Another reason the CARP proceeding failed was because of the lump sum
payment requirement. '85 Given that the CARP rendered a decision almost four
years after the passage of the DMCA, their decision became retroactive and past
royalties became all due at one time. 16 The CARP obviously did not have small
webcasters in mind, as they did not allow for some sort of payment schedule.
So, again, Congress needed to enact legislation to rectify the situation.187
Last, the standards regulating the CARPs are inconsistent and offer poor
guidance.' 88 This CARP focused on the "willing buyer/willing seller standard,"
a standard which at least one expert believes does not exist.'89 In using this
standard generally, "the 'true' value . . . is less important that the parties' per-
184. A mixture of tiered structures could prove the best situation. For non-profit or non-
revenue-producing webcasters, a proposal could allow the broadcaster to pay a set fee per year,
while those with revenues would pay a percentage, increasing based on their level of revenue.
185. See supra note 135.
186. Id.
187. Specifically, Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the Small Webcasters Settle-
ment Act of 2002. See supra note 120.
188. While § 801 provides goals for the CARP to satisfy, the criteria of "willing buyer/willing
seller" maybe contradictory to these goals. Section 1 14(f)(2)(B) provides further criteria in addition
to the § 801 standards as well as the "willing buyer/willing seller" standard:
(i) whether use of the service may substitute for or may promote the sales of phonore-
cords or otherwise may interfere with or may enhance the sound recording copyright
owner's other steams of revenue from its sound recordings; and (ii) the relative roles of
the copyright owner and the transmitting entity in the copyrighted work and the service
made available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, technological
contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk.
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 2004). "These criteria do not add flexibility as they simply
reflect the considerations that willing buyers and sellers will take into account in the normal course
of their negotiations." Jackson, supra note 23, at 473. Also, with regards to § 1 14(f)(2)(B)(i), the
record companies argue that the digital quality of the transmission as well as the frequency of play
will serve as a substitute for owning the CD. However, the DMCA provides detailed and extensive
safeguards to prevent a user from accessing the song too easily, or playing it too frequently. See 17
U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) supra, note 40. Therefore, the type of transmission feared by the
RIAA would not even be eligible for a statutory license, and therefore the CARP should not have
taken this danger into account. Id.
189. A willing buyer/willing seller standard creates a circular logic for the Panel to follow; "to
set a fee based upon what the marketplace would have determined on its own if no statutory fee was
necessary." Jackson, supra note 23, at 476. This type of logic relies on a functioning market to set a
fair price- however no such market exists. Fessler, supra note 20, at 418. This type of "one-size-
fits-all" rate setting allows for one or two agreements, which may or may not represent the entire
industry, to set the rates for the entire industry. Id. The very existence of a CARP stifles meaningful
negotiation because parties know that if they do not get their way, arbitration might go their way. Id.
at 419. Because of this fall back, neither party absolutely must come to an agreement. Id.
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ception of that relative value."' 90 However, in setting an industry-wide royalty,
the CARP should be focusing on the real value of the material in question. If
one webcaster is willing to pay more, why is the entire industry held to that
standard when the actual value of the work may be much less?' 9' For example,
in the Yahoo!TM agreement, Yahoo!TM negotiated two rates, one for Internet-
only and one for radio retransmissions. While Yahoo!TM's primary business was
involved in radio rebroadcasts, many other webcasters were involved in Inter-
net-only transmissions. Overall, Yahoo!TM paid a reasonable rate for both. But
separately, Yahoo!TM paid much more for the Internet-only rights than for the
radio retransmission rights.' 92 Yahoo!Tm did not actually value the Internet-only
rights more; in fact, the opposite was true. Yet, according to the CARP, the
Yahoo!TM rate represents the best evidence of the value of the Internet-only
rights. ' By abandoning the "willing buyer/willing seller standard," and revert-
ing back to the §801 (b)(1) guidelines, CARPs can be sure that their determina-
tions are not subject to clever negotiating."'
VI. CONCLUSION
Obviously, the CARP system cannot be allowed to stand. The system was
created in order to alleviate the problems with the old Copyright Royalty Trib-
une, but even this system has outlived its usefulness. " While the CARP could
be reformed, some experts believe that elimination of the Panel entirely would
190. Jackson, supra note 23, at 476.
191. U.S. Bankruptcy Courts recognize that the "willing buyer/willing seller standard" for
determining fair value is rendered useless when other business motives are furthered through posi-
tion driven bargaining, as was the case between the RIAA and Yahoo!TM. In re Brentwood Lexford
Partners, LLC., 292 BR. 255, 269 (N.D. Tex. 2003) ("The Equity/BLP transaction was not a willing
buyer, willing seller transaction. It was more in the nature of an insider transaction designed to
further other business objectives. The amount of the note in 1998 therefore does not inform the fair
value of BLP's assets in March 2000.").
192. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 473.
193. See supra note 93; see also, 67 Fed. Reg. 45239, supra note 59, at 45252.
194. In the field of patents, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116
(D.C.N.Y. 1970), stands as the leading case in setting royalty rates. In that case, the court deter-
mined that a willing buyer/willing seller standard is more of a "statement of approach [rather] than a
tool of analysis." Id. at 1121. Georgia-Pacific sets forth fifteen individual criteria to be used to
determine what a reasonable buyer would have paid, and what a reasonable seller would have ac-
cepted. Id. at 1120. Upon analysis, these factors roughly equate to those factors set forth in § 801 of
the Copyright Act. Cf. id at 1120 to 17 U.S.C. § 801.
195. Congress passed the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, abolishing the CRT
structure and replacing it with the CARP. Maxey, supra note 141, at 390. One reason for this
change was industry-wide displeasure with the CRT's royalty rate decision for the cable industry's
retransmission of certain copyrighted TV programs. Id. "Ted Turner, of Turner Broadcasting,
called for the abolition of CRT and testified before Congress, '[t]his CRT decision puts us out of
business."' Id. The question now becomes who in the webcasting community, with enough power,
will step up and call for the abolition of the CARP.
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be most effective.' 96 One forum for accomplishing this goal would be to elimi-
nate the compulsory license, therefore eliminating the need for a statutorily
regulated rate. 1' "CARP participants, both licensees and copyright owners,
would have found a far more satisfactory outcome had they chosen to spend
their money and effort negotiating a reasonable settlement in the marketplace
rather than in a CARP."'
98
For now, it appears that webcasters and copyright owners have come to an
agreement that circumvents the need for CARP proceedings. However, this in
no way alleviates or eliminates the need for effective CARP reform. CARP
proceedings are not merely instituted to determine musical royalties, but for any
copyrighted work with a compulsory license. Also, if not for practical purposes,
reform should be implemented for theoretical purposes. Creators and owners of
copyrighted works on a whole cannot, and should not, be forced to rely on a
system that is proven flawed. Under §801 (b)(1), a goal of the CARP is to afford
copyright owners fair return for their creative developments."' Without an
effective system in place, an author may be discouraged from creating (which
cannot happen). After all, the purpose of copyright is "To Promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts."200 The sooner the U.S. can institute a better system,
the sooner the system will work for everyone involved, buyers, sellers, and the
public as a whole.
196. Id. at 399. During the 1980s and 1990s when the CRT was under reform, Congress enter-
tained the notion of eliminating compulsory licenses altogether. However, they retained the compul-
sory license structure and simply restructured the process. See CARP Structure, supra note 177, at
47-49, n.213.
197. Maxey, supra note 141, at 399. Eliminating the statutory license would also eliminate the
need for a CARP proceeding at all. Statutory licenses, in support of this theory, "tend to outlive
their purpose and create marketplace dislocations." Id. Yet, the question remains whether small
webcasters would be safeguarded from anti-competitive behavior by copyright owners. Id.
198. Id. (quoting CARP Structure, supra note 177, at 49).
199. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2004); see supra note 63.
200. U.S. CONST. art. I , § 8, cl. 8
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